Wednesday, September 9, 2015
Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism
By Shane C. Goodwin, Adjunct Professor (Finance and Managerial Economics), University of Texas Dallas
In his paper, the author finds statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, his findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement.
Download the full article here.
From the September 2015 issue of Barclay's Insider Report. Accredited investors can subscribe to the full newsletter for free.
In his paper, the author finds statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, his findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement.
Download the full article here.
From the September 2015 issue of Barclay's Insider Report. Accredited investors can subscribe to the full newsletter for free.
Labels: Barclay Insider Report, Barclay Insider Report Guest Article, Corporate governance, hedge fund activism, hedge funds, proxy fights, shareholder activism, shareholder rights
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